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Introduction
Economic theories suggest that government ideology is correlated with military expenditure.
The partisan approaches claim that left-wing governments pursue more expansionary economic policies than right-wing governments (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1987) . Expansionary economic policies include a large size of government. Left-wing governments may thus also endorse military expenditure, especially when they recruit additional military personnel and employees who are not competitive in the labour market. By recruiting non-competitive employees or reintegrating unemployed individuals in the labour market, left-wing governments gratify their constituencies.
1 By contrast, right-wing governments and their electorates tend to endorse security and support the hierarchies and discipline that are associated with armed forces. In a similar vein, right-wing governments advocate interventionist (hawkish) or even imperialist foreign policies, and left-wing governments advocate dovish foreign policies (see Whitten and Williams 2011) . The extent to which government ideology is correlated with military expenditure thus remains an undetermined empirical question.
Empirical studies examining how government ideology is correlated with military expenditure arrive at ambiguous conclusions. It is conceivable that previous panel-data studies did not show strong ideologyinduced effects because in European countries 'there is very little uniformity in the factors that determine each country's demand for military expenditure' (Nikolaidou 2008, 273) . In particular, government ideology is an excellent case in point. Single-country studies have
shown that in countries such as Greece and Sweden military expenditure was somewhat higher under left-wing governments, while in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Turkey military expenditure was higher under right-wing governments and legislatures.
Evidence for the United States is mixed (see Kollias and Paleologou 2003; Eichenberg and Stoll 2003; Karagol and Turhan 2008; Dalen and Swank 1996; Wlezien 1996; Nincic and Cusack 1979; Correa and Kim 1992) .
We examine how government ideology was correlated with the growth in military expenditure in Germany. There have been three previous studies referring to that issue.
3 Eichenberg and Stoll (2003) used data from the late 1960s until 1998 and show that the change in military expenditure was somewhat lower, the higher the percentage of conservative legislatures. The authors proposed that the social-democratic chancellor Helmut
Schmidt (in office 1974-1982) was one of the left-wing 'proponents of a strong defense -or at least proponents of a balanced commitment to defense and negotiation'. Moreover: '… that the end of the cold war and the consequent reductions in defense spending occurred in some prominent cases under Conservatives: … Kohl …' (p. 413). Maneval (1994) Examining German military expenditure in a single-country study is a worthwhile endeavour because Germany initiated the Second World War, and involving German forces in any military conflict has been a big issue ever since. 'Germany's aversion to the use of force and its embrace of multilateralism is a reaction to the country's past. As one of Germany's eminent scholars on the subject argued, the "first lesson drawn from the Nazi period was a widespread, instinctive pacifism, a rejection of anything military and of any use of force."' (Giegerich 2003, 4) . Elaborating on the mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan, Auerswald and Saideman (2014, 22) (Maneval 1994, 222) .
Germany joined the NATO in 1955. Holding off forces in military conflicts notwithstanding, Germany did not free-ride on NATO burdens (see, for example, Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Sandler and Forbes 1980; Solomon 2004; Sandler and Shimizu 2014) .
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the German Federal Statistical Office for military expenditure and GDP from 1950-1990 for former West Germany and from 1991-2011 for reunified Germany. Table   1 shows descriptive statistics and data sources. Klingemann et al. (2006) , and Volkens et al. (2014) . We describe the indices of Bjørnskov (2008a) and the CMP data, and descriptive statistics using these indices below.
The differences between left-wing and right-wing governments will be tested on the left-right scale using the variable Left and, in an alternative specification, by using different coalition type dummies. The dummy variable Left takes on the value 1 when a left-wing, 0.5 when a center (grand coalition), and 0 when a right-wing government was in office.
Distinguishing left-wing, center, and right-wing governments by using this variable corresponds to measuring government ideology as proposed, for example, by Budge et al. (1993) and Woldendorp et al. (1998 Woldendorp et al. ( , 2000 and employed by Potrafke (2009b) . Alternatively, the coalition type dummy variables take on the value 1 when the considered coalition type was in power and 0 otherwise. We distinguish between four different coalition types that governed at the German federal level: CDU/CSU/FDP (right-wing), SPD/FDP (left-wing), SPD/Greens (left-wing), and CDU/CSU/SPD (center; reference category). Columns (1) to (3) in Table 2 show the means of military expenditure (in percent of GDP) in levels and growth rates under left-wing, center, and right-wing governments.
Military expenditure accounted for 2.21% under left-wing, 2.14% under center, and 3.01% of GDP under right-wing governments. Variance analysis shows that the differences of the means in levels are statistically significant at the 10% level. Individual tests show that the differences between the means between left-wing and right-wing governments are statistically significant at the 10% level. The growth rate in military expenditure (in percent of GDP) was about -1.56% under left-wing, -1.16% under center, and -2.30% under right-wing governments. Differences do not turn out to be statistically significant. Bjørnskov's (2008a) index refers to the Henisz (2000) database on political outcomes since the 19 th century, and the general approach to measuring political ideology follows along the lines of Bjørnskov (2005 Bjørnskov ( , 2008b . However, as compared to the index employed in Bjørnskov (2005 Bjørnskov ( , 2008b , the Bjørnskov (2008a) 
Empirical Model
The baseline regression model has the following form: Table 4 shows the regression results. The variable Left and the individual coalition type dummy variables do not turn out to be statistically significant. The growth rate in government spending (in percent of GDP) is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (4).
Results
The numerical meaning of the effect is that when government spending (in percent of GDP)
increased by 1%, military expenditure (in percent of GDP) increased by about 1.21%. The elasticity is likely to be larger than one because our measure of government expenditure does not include spending for social affairs. The coefficients of the growth rates in population and GDP per capita and the reunification dummy lack statistical significance.
Previous studies on ideology-induced policy making in Germany showed that government ideology influenced economic policy making in the 1970s and 1980s: left-wing governments spent more than right-wing governments. Thanks to the decline in electoral cohesion after the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is also conceivable that ideology-induced policy making changed after 1990. We therefore include dummy variables for the 1970-1990 period and the 1991-2011 period and interact the individual dummy variables with the variable Left.
The results in Table 5 show, however, that government ideology had no statistically significant effect in the 1970-1990 period and the 1991-2011 period. Table 6 shows that government ideology as measured by Bjørnskov (2008a) does not turn out to be statistically significant. Previous studies already arrived at the conclusion that using the measure for government ideology of Bjørnskov (2008a) 2013) . 7 The party program that was used to code the ideology of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) relating to the elections in 1957 was significantly shorter than all other CDU party platforms: the party program only included 18 sentences compared to 393 sentences on average over our sample period. The effect shown in Table 7 thus cannot be generalized. Table 8 .
Conclusion
Why and the German government's announcement that it seeks to turn the army into an attractive workplace may also give rise to higher military spending. In fact, the government that is likely 8 See Bove and Cavatorta (2012) on the composition of military expenditure in NATO countries (personnel, equipment, infrastructure, other) . 9 In the German states, government ideology did have an effect: right-wing governments spent more on universities, introduced tuition fees, hired more cops, and promoted economic freedom (Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007; Kauder and Potrafke 2013; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013; Potrafke 2013) . 10 Smith (2013) predicts that the military industry is likely to become more concentrated when the world gets more peaceful and military expenditure decreases.
to increase military expenditure consists of the conservative CDU/CSU and the socialdemocratic SPD. The consensus between left-wing and right-wing parties in military affairs and in increasing the size of the government appears to persist. (5) to (7) show the individual differences of the means and p-values in brackets. The p-values in columns (5) to (7) refer to the test of Scheffé (1953) . 
